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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Justin Lee Wilson appeals from his judgment of conviction for driving under the 
influence, entered pursuant to his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he challenges the 
district court's orders denying his motion to exclude witnesses and his oral motion, on 
the day of trial, for a continuance. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On June 28, 2012, police were dispatched in response to a citizen's report of a 
person possibly driving under the influence. (R., p.13.) The witnesses followed the 
suspect to the Silver Fox Bar. (Id.) Police arrived shortly thereafter and, entering the 
bar, asked the bartender who had entered just prior to them. (Id.) The bartender 
indicated that Wilson was the most recent patron. (Id.) 
The officer had Wilson exit the bar, but as the officer requested that Wilson stand 
next to his vehicle, Wilson became uncooperative and attempted to reenter the bar. (R., 
pp.13-14.) The officer handcuffed Wilson and forcefully escorted him back to the 
officer's vehicle. (R., p.14.) A witness positively identified Wilson as the person who 
had been driving under the influence. (Id.) Wilson refused to perform any standard field 
sobriety tests, and officers arrested him for driving under the influence. (Id.) Officers 
later transported Wilson to Kootenai Medical Center where a blood draw revealed that 
Wilson had a BAC of 0.203. (R., pp.14-15; PSI, p.77.) 
The state charged Wilson with felony driving under the influence (his third DUI 
offense within the previous ten years). (R., pp.69-70.) Wilson pleaded not guilty and 
the case was set for trial. (R., p.75.) Shortly before trial, Wilson filed a motion to 
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exclude testimony from two witnesses, arguing that they had been disclosed late. (R., 
pp.140-41.) The district court denied that motion. (R., p.152.) On the day of trial, 
Wilson made an oral motion for the court to reconsider its prior ruling on the witnesses 
or to grant a continuance. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) The district court modified 
its order in regards to one of the witnesses, Ms. Oxner, allowing her to only testify in 
rebuttal (Id., p.15, Ls.11-17), and denied the continuance (Id., p.18, Ls.13-16). 
Wilson then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the 
district court's denial of his motions. (R., pp.154, 156-67.) The district court entered 
judgment against Wilson and sentenced him to a unified term of five years with two 
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.159-61.) Wilson filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (R., pp.162-64.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court 
suspended Wilson's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years. 
(Judgment on Retained Jurisdiction (Augmentation).) 
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ISSUES 
Wilson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Wilson's rights to due process and 
compulsory process when it denied Mr. Wilson's motion for a continuance 
of the trial to allow additional time to interview the State's late-disclosed 
witnesses and to disclose additional defense witnesses? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Wilson's 
motion to exclude the State's late-disclosed witnesses? 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Wilson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion to exclude the rebuttal testimony of the bartender, Ms. Oxner? 
2. Has Wilson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying 




Wilson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Motion To Exclude Rebuttal Witness Testimony 
A. Introduction 
On September 24, 2012, the state submitted its first witness list, reserving the 
right to supplement its discovery as the evidence became available. (Plaintiff's Witness 
List (Augmentation).) At a pretrial conference on November 15, 2012, the district court 
noted that the state had submitted its list of witnesses and asked Wilson to have his 
submitted by 5:00 p.m. the following day. (11/15/2012 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) On November 
29, 2012, the state amended its witness list adding "Sheila Oxnerd, Silver Fox Bar." 
(Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List (Augmentation).) The following day, the state filed a 
second amended witness list, correcting the spelling of Ms. Oxner's name. (Second 
Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List (Augmentation).) Then, on December 10, 2012 (the 
day before trial), the state amended its witness list a final time, relevant to this appeal, 
by adding Ms. Oxner's phone number. (Third Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List 
(Augmentation).) 
Prior to the state's third amendment, Wilson filed a motion to, inter alia, exclude 
testimony from Ms. Oxner because she was disclosed after the discovery cut-off date. 
(R., pp.140-41.) The district court agreed that Ms. Oxner was disclosed late, but denied 
Wilson's motion. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.31, L.12-p.33, L.7; R., p.152.) The state engaged 
in a diligent effort to locate and disclose Ms. Oxner to the defense. (12/10/2012 Tr., 
p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.16.) However, though the district court would not exclude Ms. 
Oxner, it required the state to make her available to the defense for interviewing, and 
4 
restricted the state from calling her to testify until the defense had an opportunity to 
interview her. (Id., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.7.) 
On the day of trial, Wilson asked the court to reconsider its ruling allowing Ms. 
Oxner to testify. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) Responding to the renewed motion, 
the district court exercised its discretion and limited Ms. Oxner's testimony to rebuttal 
only. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.) On appeal, Wilson asserts that the court abused 
its discretion by not completely excluding Ms. Oxner from testifying. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.10-16.) Applying the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, 
shows no abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of an 
appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court." State v. Huntsman, 146 
Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 162 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 
185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). "[T]he trial court's exercise of that discretion is 
beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it has been clearly abused." State v. 
Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 
173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)). 
C. Because The District Court Limited Ms. Oxner's Testimony To Rebuttal Only, 
The State's Failure To Timely Disclose Her Was Cured 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Pursuant to Rule 
16(a), a prosecutor is required to disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence within 
the prosecutor's possession or control. I.C.R. 16(a); see also State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 
726, 739, 692 P.2d 370, 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (prosecutor is constitutionally required to 
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disclose exculpatory evidence); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 106, 685 P.2d 837, 847 
(Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he constitutional duty of disclosure and the requirement to disclose 
under Rule 16(a) both relate to exculpatory evidence."). A prosecutor is also "required 
by rule to disclose, upon request, the names and addresses of persons having 
knowledge of the relevant facts." Lopez, 107 Idaho at 739, 692 P.2d at 383 (citing 
I.C.R. 16(b)(6)). But that duty to disclose witnesses does not extend "to persons called 
for rebuttal." ]it (citing Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837); see also State v. Karpach, 
146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting "general rule 
that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed"); State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho 482, 486, 
700 P.2d 104, 108 (Ct. App. 1985) ("There is no constitutional duty for the state to 
disclose potentially inculpatory testimony of a rebuttal witness."). 
The district court's ultimate ruling that limited Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony 
cured any defect in the state's late disclosure of that witness. Because the state does 
not have a duty to disclose rebuttal witnesses to the defense, it could no longer violate 
the discovery rules by disclosing Ms. Oxner's identity and contact information after the 
discovery cut-off date. Wilson has failed to show that the district court abuse its 
discretion by properly limiting Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony only. 
D. Wilson Has Also Failed To Show That The District Court's Ruling Rendered His 
Trial Unfair 
Wilson has also failed to show that allowing Ms. Oxner to testify only in rebuttal 
unfairly prejudiced his defense. Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, 
and the choice of an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court. 
Allen, 145 Idaho at 185, 177 P.3d at 399. A party seeking the exclusion of evidence as 
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a sanction for a discovery violation must establish prejudice. Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 
663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996). "Where a late-disclosed witness has 
been allowed to testify despite an untimely disclosure, [the appellate court] will not 
reverse a conviction in the absence of a showing that the delay prejudiced the 
defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense." Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586, 
199 P.3d at 161 (citing State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206 
(1999); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999)). As 
explained by the Court of Appeals: 
The inquiry on appeal is whether the lateness of the disclosure so 
prejudiced the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense that 
he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial. 
This ordinarily requires that the complaining party demonstrate that the 
late disclosure hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a 
deleterious effect on his trial strategy, or that it deprived him of the 
opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence. 
Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 587, 199 P.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted). Wilson insists 
on appeal that his trial preparation was prejudiced by the late disclosure (Appellant's 
brief, pp.10-15), but he has failed to show how it was prejudiced. 
Because the district court limited Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony, the state's late 
disclosure of the witness could not "hamper [Wilson's] ability to meet the evidence at 
trial" or "ha[ve] a deleterious effect on his trial strategy." Wilson controlled whether or 
not Ms. Oxner could present any evidence against him. "Rebuttal evidence is evidence 
which explains, repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence which has been introduced 
by or on behalf of the adverse party." State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 655, 873 P.2d 905, 
909 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). In the context of a criminal case, it is "evidence 
offered by the prosecution to contradict the evidence in the defendant's case-in-chief." 
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Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285 n.2 (citing Lopez, 107 Idaho at 
739, 692 P.2d at 383). If Wilson did not present a case-in-chief, Ms. Oxner would have 
nothing to rebut and so would be excluded from testifying. 
And not presenting a case-in-chief was, in fact, Wilson's trial strategy: When 
asked what would have precluded the state from calling Ms. Oxner as a rebuttal witness 
without disclosing her, defense counsel acknowledged that the state could do that, "but 
she wouldn't have been able to be called as a rebuttal evidence [sic] if I didn't present 
any evidence for her to rebut." (12/11/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-25.) Defense counsel then 
explained that, "[p]rior to Ms. Oxner's testimony, I had not planned on my client 
testifying or presenting any witnesses and there would have been nothing for her to 
present in rebuttal." (Id., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.3.) Allowing Ms. Oxner to testify as a 
rebuttal witness could not have been detrimental to Wilson's trial strategy because, if he 
had followed that strategy, there would have been no rebuttal and Ms. Oxner would 
have never been able to testify. 
The district court's sanction of the state for its discovery violation, limiting Ms. 
Oxner to rebuttal testimony, cured any violation from the state. Moreover, Wilson has 
failed to show that the late disclosure of Ms. Oxner, where she was limited to testifying 
in rebuttal, in any way prejudiced his defense. Wilson has failed to show that the district 
court abused its discretion by limiting Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony. The district court 
should be affirmed. 
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11. 
Wilson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
His Oral Motion, Offered On The Day Of Trial, For A Continuance 
A. Introduction 
As an alternative to his motion to prohibit the state from presenting the testimony 
of Ms. Oxner, Wilson requested a continuance. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) After 
limiting Ms. Oxner to a rebuttal witness, the district court denied Wilson's motion for a 
continuance. (Id., p.18, Ls.13-16.) Wilson claims on appeal that the district court erred 
by not granting his continuance. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.) Wilson has failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion, however, because he has failed to establish 
that his substantial rights were prejudiced as a result of the denial of his motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to grant a continuance rests within the discretion of the trial 
judge. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995); State v. Averett, 
142 Idaho 879, 889, 136 P.3d 350, 360 (Ct. App. 2006). "Unless an appellant shows 
that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for 
continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion." 
kl (citing State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)). 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Wilson's Motion For A Continuance 
"[W]here the denial of a motion to continue is attacked on the basis of late 
disclosure or discovery of evidence, the alleged tardiness of the disclosure must be 
shown to so prejudice the defendant's case preparation that a fair trial was denied." 
Tapia, 127 Idaho at 255, 899 P.2d at 965 (citing State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 770, 
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710 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1985); State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 858-59, 590 P.2d 1001, 
1004-05 (1978)). "To prove prejudice, a defendant must show there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for the late-disclosure of evidence, the result of the proceedings 
would have been different." !st (citing State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034, 812 
P.2d 744, 748 (Ct. App. 1991)). 
Just as he failed to demonstrate prejudice in relation to the denial of his motion to 
exclude the testimony of Ms. Oxner, Wilson has failed to demonstrate that he was 
prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. First, his case did not actually 
go to trial, so he cannot show that he received an unfair trial. Second, as noted above, 
even his intended trial strategy was unaffected by the district court giving permission for 
Ms. Oxner to testify as a rebuttal witness only. Below and on appeal, Wilson claims he 
needed a continuance to locate "witnesses to counter [Ms. Oxner's] expected 
testimony." (See Appellant's brief, p.6; 12/11/2012 Tr., p.6, L.12 - p.7, L.5.) But had 
Wilson followed his trial strategy, he would have effectively excluded Ms. Oxner from 
testifying, and there would have been no testimony to counter. 
On appeal, Wilson further asserts that he was prejudiced by the denial of a 
/' 
continuance and that the state would not have been prejudiced by the granting of the 
continuance. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Wilson is wrong on both counts. At the 
hearing on his motion, defense counsel acknowledged that "[s]ince the beginning of this 
case Mr. Wilson's and l's [sic] theory of the case was that he had drank [sic] in the bar." 
(12/11/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14.) As that was always his defense, Wilson had ample time 
to prepare it. Defense counsel's real difficulty in locating witnesses for Wilson was that 
Wilson had only provided sufficient information for one witness, and that witness would 
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not return defense counsel's calls. (12/4/2012 Tr., p.7, L.16 - p.8, L.1.) The court is not 
required to give the defense unlimited time to marshal evidence in support of its theory 
of the case. That Wilson failed to gather any evidence in support of his theory of the 
case before trial does not show prejudice. 
Unlike Wilson, the state would have been prejudiced if the district court granted 
Wilson's continuance. The parties anticipated that the trial would last for three days. A 
key witness for the state, Ms. Mayfield, who saw Wilson, intoxicated, climb into his 
vehicle and drive (R., p.20), was in the legal custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction. On December 5, 2012, she was sentenced in an unrelated case to a period 
of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.136.) Rather than transport her immediately, the district 
court ordered that she be retained in the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff's 
Department until December 14, 2012, to make her available for trial. (R., p.138.) Had 
the continuance been granted and Ms. Mayfield been transferred, she may have not 
been available to testify at trial or, at least, it would have been difficult to arrange for her 
testimony at trial. 
Ultimately Wilson's argument to the district court amounted to nothing more than 
a claim that he would have liked more time to gather evidence and witnesses for a case 
that, according to counsel, he did not intend to present. (See 12/11/2012 Tr., p.11, L.25 
- p.12, L.3.) To prevail on his motion for a continuance, Wilson had the burden of 
demonstrating that he would be prejudiced in the presentation of his case. He cannot 
meet that burden by merely claiming that he wished to conduct additional investigation. 
But that was the only claim he made to the district court. Because he failed to show 
actual prejudice at trial from the denial of his request for a continuance, or even 
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prejudice to his trial preparation, he has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion or violated his due process rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders 
denying Wilson's motion to exclude rebuttal witness testimony and denying his motion 
for a continuance. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2015. 
( 9.,df1PI .. /?/d/4-
--RU~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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